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We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects: the SEAMO (simul-
taneous English auction for multiple objects) and the the JAMO (Japanese
auction for multiple objects). We ﬁrst derive a (competitive) Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium of the JAMO by exploiting the strategic equivalence between
the JAMO and the Survival Auction which consists of a ﬁnite sequence of
sealed-bid auctions. Then, we prove that many of the (unwanted) collusive or
signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO
do not have a counterpart in the JAMO. However, it is shown that certain
collusive equilibria based on retaliatory strategies do exist in both auctions.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D44.
Keywords: Multi-unit auctions, Ascending auctions, FCC auctions, Col-
lusion, Retaliation.1 Introduction
Since the ﬁrst series of FCC spectrum auctions held in the US, academics and
policymakers alike have recognized almost unanimously at least three main
advantages of the openness and simultaneity of the FCC auction rules: They
ensure a fully transparent bidding process, that enables extensive information
revelation of bidders’ valuations, and at the same time allows bidders to build
eﬃcient aggregations of licenses.2 Yet the openness and simultaneity of the
FCC auctions also facilitate tacit collusion. Bidders can observe each other’s
behavior and can thus coordinate on collusive agreements. Cramton and
Schwartz (1999, 2000) report on bidding phases of the FCC which illustrate
many of the communication and coordination devices tacitly used in practice
by bidders; Klemperer (2001) provides further evidence and discussion, also
relating to the recent European UMTS auctions.
In this paper we consider two auction mechanisms which are simpliﬁed
versions of the FCC and of some European UMTS auctions: The SEAMO (si-
multaneous English auction for multiple objects), which is the version closer
to the actual FCC auctions, and the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple
objects), which diﬀers in at least two basic respects. Both auctions are si-
multaneous ascending auctions. However, unlike the SEAMO and the FCC
auctions, in the JAMO, prices are raised directly by the auctioneer, and clos-
ing is not simultaneous but rather license-by-license. We show that these two
diﬀerences are already suﬃcient to eliminate many (unwanted) collusive or
signaling equilibria that are equilibria of the SEAMO.3 In particular, jump
bid equilibria constructed in Gunderson and Wang (1998) and collusive equi-
libria constructed in Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) and Brusco and
Lopomo (2001) are not equilibria of the JAMO. Nonetheless, we show that
equilibria involving retaliatory strategies do exist in both the JAMO and the
SEAMO. These equilibria share some features with bidding behavior reported
by Cramton and Schwartz (1999, 2000) in the actual FCC auctions.
More generally, our results are inspired by the following questions: Can
we establish a link between some well identiﬁed auction rules in the FCC auc-
2See e.g., McAfee and McMillan (1996), Cramton (1997, 1998), Milgrom (1998), Cram-
ton and Schwartz (1999, 2000), Klemperer (2001).
3Albano et al. (2001) and Branco (2001) provide evidence that the JAMO may
perform well in terms of both eﬃciency and revenue in certain environments with
complementarities.
1tions and the emergence of a particular type of collusive equilibria? To what
extent are signaling, collusive or retaliatory strategies sensitive to certain
modiﬁcations of the auction rules? These questions are more than theoretic
preoccupations. Economists and market designers weigh oﬀ the pros and
cons of diﬀerent auction mechanisms in order to maximize revenue and/or
eﬃciency in the allocation of scarce resources. However, the pursuit of those
objectives would be hampered by choosing an auction mechanism which is
deemed to facilitate collusion or retaliation. Our analysis suggests that the
SEAMO does facilitate (tacit) collusion relative to the JAMO.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description of the
framework and of the actual auction rules. In Section 3, which is the main
section, we consider a series of signaling equilibria and show that many of
the equilibria of the SEAMO have no counterpart in the JAMO. Section 4
indicates some directions for future research. The main proofs are contained
in the Appendix.
2 Three Ascending Auctions
2.1 Framework
Throughout the paper we work with a framework close to the one of Krishna
and Rosenthal (1996). Two objects are auctioned to a set of participants
of two types: M global bidders who are interested in both objects and Nk
local bidders who are interested in only one of the two objects, k =1 ,2.
Both global and local bidders draw their values all independently from some
smooth distribution F with positive density f,b o t hd e ﬁned over [0,1]. Let
vk and uk denote the stand-alone value of object k =1 ,2t oag l o b a la n dt o
a local bidder respectively. The value of the bundle vB to a global bidder is
greater or equal to the sum of stand-alone values, that is,
vB = v1 + v2 + α,
where α ≥ 0 is commonly known and coincides across all global bidders. The
nature of bidders, local and global, is also commonly known.4
4The fact that a bidder with v1 =0a n dv2 > 0q u a l i ﬁes as a global bidder when α =0
is a degenerate case; we stress that what distinguishes global from local bidders is that
2We further restrict the analysis to the following cases: (i) v1 = v2 = x ∈
[0,1] and α ≥ 0. (ii) v1,v 2 ∈ [0,1] and α = 0; (iii) v1,v 2 ∈ [0,1] and α > 1;
Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) consider case (i); Brusco and Lopomo (2001)
consider cases (ii) and (iii).
2.2 Auction Rules
The auction mechanisms we consider are more or less simpliﬁed versions of
the simultaneous ascending auction used by the FCC for the sale of spec-
trum licenses in the US. The third mechanism (SA) is equivalent to the ﬁrst
(JAMO) and is used mainly to simplify some of the analysis. We brieﬂy
describe the rules.
JAMO: Prices start from zero for all objects and are simultaneously and
continuously increased on all objects until only one agent is left on a given
object, in which case prices on that auction stop and continue to rise on
the remaining auctions. Once an agent has dropped from a given auction
the exit is irrevocable. The last agent receives the object at the price at
which the auction stopped. The number and the identity of agents active
on any auction is publicly known at any given time, (including information
about the identity of local and global bidders). The overall auction ends
when all agents but one have dropped out from all auctions. We refer to this
mechanism as the Japanese auction for multiple objects (JAMO); some also
refer to it as the English clock auction.
SEAMO: The auction proceeds in rounds. At each round, t =1 ,2,..,e a c h
bidder submits a vector of bids where bids for single objects are taken from
the set {∅}∪(bk(t−1),+∞), where ∅ denotes “no bid”, and bk(t−1) is the
“current outstanding” bid, that is, the highest submitted bid for object k
up to round t − 1. Thus for each object k a bidder can either remain silent
or raise the high bid of the previous round of at least ν > 0, (we take ν
arbitrarily close to zero). All licenses close simultaneously. The auction ends
if all bidders remain silent on all objects, and the winners are the “standing
high bidders” determined at round t − 1 and they pay their last bid. Given
the simultaneity of closing, we refer to this mechanism as the simultaneous
global bidders have a potential for obtainig a positive value from each object besides the
typically positive complementarity.
3English auction for multiple objects (SEAMO).
Two basic diﬀerences distinguish the two mechanisms. First, the JAMO
does not allow for rounds of bidding; bidders press buttons corresponding to
the objects on which they wish to bid; by releasing a button, a bidder quits
that auction irrevocably; thus, bidders have “smaller” strategy spaces than
in SEAMO; in particular they have no inﬂuence on the pace at which prices
rise. Second, closing is not simultaneous in the JAMO but rather license-
by-license. We shall highlight the role of these distinguishing features in the
emergence of collusive and signaling equilibria.
SA: The auction proceeds in rounds. At each round, t =1 ,2,..,e a c hb i d d e r
submits a vector of sealed bids where bids for a single object are taken from
the set {∅}∪(b(t−1),+∞), where ∅ again denotes “no bid” or “not allowed
to bid”, and b(t − 1) here is the lowest among all bids submitted during the
previous round. In the following rounds, the bidders who submitted b(t)i n
the current round, are not allowed to bid on the object where they submitted
b(t). At the end of each round the auctioneer only announces b(t), the object
for which b(t) was submitted and the identity of the bidders that submitted
the bid. An object is attributed to the last bidder having the right to bid
on that object and the winner will pay an amount of money equal to the
last lowest bid on that object. Note that since at least one bidder exits from
some object in any given round, the two objects will be attributed after at
most 2(M +N1+N2)−1 rounds. Following Fujishima et al. (1999), we refer
to this auction as the survival auction (SA).
2.3 Some Basic Results
Before turning to the collusive and signaling equilibria, we derives some basic
results on the three mechanisms just described. The main result (Prop. 2)
characterizes a natural Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the JAMO,
which in turn induces a corresponding equilibrium in the other two mecha-
nisms.
In the JAMO or the SA, the information available to a bidder at any time
t, is described by Ht.I nt h eJ A M O ,t coincides with the current level reached
by prices, while, in the SA, t represents the current minimum admissible bid
on any of the objects; in both mechanisms, Ht contains, for each object,
the set of active bidders on the object as well as, the price at which the
4other bidders dropped out. The following proposition due to Fujishima et
al. (1999) is useful in characterizing equilibria in the JAMO; it is used in the
p r o o fo fP r o p .2 .
Proposition 1 The JAMO and the SA are strategically equivalent.
Proof. The proof is as in Fujishima et al. (1999). It consists in showing
isomorphism (identity) of the information sets Ht as well as of their prece-
dence relation in the two auctions; from this one shows isomorphism (again
identity) of the action spaces and that corresponding actions induce same
payoﬀs. ¥
The proposition implies that the JAMO and the SA are outcome equiv-
alent and that their equilibria coincide. This allows us to use the easier SA
to analyze the JAMO.
Next, we derive a PBE of the SA (and JAMO), which is obtained as the
solution to certain equations deﬁning the optimal bid (or exiting time). Fix
an object, say object 1, and ﬁx a bidder who is active on the object. Let
Π(p,Ht) denote the expected payoﬀ to the bidder, if, at time t and given
the information set Ht, he submits a bid of p on that object, while the other
bidders are assumed to play optimal strategies in the current round, and all
bidders are assumed to play optimal continuation strategies in the following
rounds. We assume these have already been determined appropriately and
are known to the bidder. It can be shown that optimal bids (equivalently,




These conditions can be used to compute, for any bidder and any object, the
optimal bid (equivalently, exiting time). Consider a bidder active only on one
object, say 1; he will bid p = v,w h e r ev is his value added from purchasing
object 1, (i.e., u1 or v1 for locals or globals buying only that object, and
v1 + α for globals who have already bought object 2). This can be obtained
from Eq. (1) since it reduces to (v − p) · g(p) ≤ 0 for some density g,w h i c h
yields the standard condition, p = v, for English or second price auctions on
one object. Similarly, in the absence of synergies (case (ii)) a global bidder
active on both object will bid v1 on object 1 and v2 on object 2. In cases
(i) and (iii), if all local bidders have already exited the auction, the game is
5equivalent to an auction for a single object, the bundle, where bidders pay
twice their bid, and so, a global bidder will bid vB/2o ne a c ho b j e c t . 5 In
the presence of both global and local bidders, the characterization of optimal
bid in cases (i) and (iii) is more complex: for a global bidder active on both










where πLk(p,Ht) is the continuation payoﬀ if a local bidder on object k and
all the other global bidders on the two objects set the lowest bid p in the
round corresponding to Ht,a n dfN1+N2(·|t) is another conditional density
that is speciﬁed in the proof. Notice that as long as local bidders are active,
the bid that solves Eq. (2) does not depend on the number of other global
bidders active on the two objects. We can state:
Proposition 2 Suppose bidders bid only on objects they value. Then the
exiting times for both local and global bidders conditional on information
until time t, {τ∗(Ht)}, which are obtained as the smallest solutions to Eq. (1),
constitute a symmetric PBE of the JAMO.
Proof. See the Appendix. ¥
Thanks to Prop. 1, we can prove Prop. 2 without using the optimal-
stopping machinery that would be necessary to compute the exiting time in
the JAMO. Indeed, as the SA ends in a ﬁnite number of rounds, we can
characterize the equilibrium using backward induction arguments.
A crucial step in the proof of Prop. 2 is that , in cases (i) and (iii), a global
bidders active on two objects has a best response to submit the same bid for
the two objects. In other words, in the JAMO, a global bidder exits both
objects simultaneously. Therefore, his optimal bid will not depend on how
the other bidders behave after he has quit the auctions. This simpliﬁes the
characterization of the equilibrium. Moreover, in case (i), it can be shown
5For example, when the complementarity is very high, say α > 2, a global bidder is
always willing to pay for the bundle more than any two local bidders, and so all local
bidders will exit in early rounds of the auction, and only global bidders will bid for the
bundle.
6that the equilibrium of Prop. 2 is the unique symmetric PBE in (weakly)
undominated strategies when bidders bid only on objects they value.6
However, for intermediate values of α ∈ (0,1), and if v1 and v2 are diﬀer-
ent, submitting the same bid on the two objects is not always optimal. Then
a global bidder’s optimal bids will depend on how exiting on one object will
aﬀect the other global bidders’ behavior on the other object. In this case
showing existence of a PBE is already problematic.7
Next, we relate equilibria of the SEAMO and the JAMO.
Proposition 3 Every PBE of the JAMO induces a PBE of the SEAMO.
Proof. Let {t∗(Ht)} be the exiting times constituting a PBE for the JAMO.
Then all bidders bidding the standing high bid plus an arbitrarily small bid
increment in each round and stopping to bid according to these exiting times
(also along out of equilibrium paths) constitutes an (arbitrarily close) PBE
of the SEAMO. Because winning bidders pay their own last high bid and
because of the simultaneity of the closing, there are no proﬁtable deviations
from the above strategies. ¥
This also implies that the set of outcomes induced by PBE of the JAMO
is contained in the set of outcomes induced by PBE of the SEAMO. The
converse of this as well as of Prop. 3 is not true; the SEAMO has many more
equilibria. In what follows, we will see examples of equilibria that are PBE
of the SEAMO but not otherwise.
In particular, Prop. 3 implies that the equilibrium of Prop. 2 has a coun-
terpart in the SEAMO. Albano et al. (2001), within an example with 2 objects
and 4 bidders, argue that the JAMO obtains close to ex-post eﬃciency with
higher revenues than the revenue-maximizing ex-post eﬃcient mechanism,
and that it dominates both the sequential and the one-shot simultaneous
auctions in terms of ex-ante eﬃciency. Branco (2001) obtains similar re-
sults in a somewhat diﬀerent framework. Given the above proposition, these
results immediately extend to corresponding equilibria of the SEAMO.
6See Section 3.3 for more discussion on the latter assumption. Essentially, it says that
local bidders do not bid on both objects.
7For example, Athey’s (2001) theorem does not apply due to the presence of non uni-
dimensional signals; McAdams’ (2001) theorem does not apply because of the modularity
condition on the payoﬀs.
73 Collusive and Signaling Equilibria
In this section, we consider certain collusive and signaling devices and equi-
libria that have been studied in the literature, typically in the framework of
the SEAMO, and show that they are not viable in the JAMO, due to the
more restrictive nature of the strategy spaces. We also construct equilibria
involving retaliatory strategies for both the JAMO and the SEAMO.
3.1 Some Signaling Devices
Bidders in the FCC auctions attempted to communicate in a variety of ways.
Since there is no way of proving any private exchange of information among
bidders, we are bound to analyze communication arising through the ex-
ploitation of the auction rules themselves. This section analyzes some com-
mon communication devices also apparently used in the actual FCC auctions,
namely code and jump bidding, and withdrawal bids, from the viewpoint of
the JAMO.
Code Bidding: Code bidding is one of the more obvious forms of signaling.
Since bids are expressed in dollars and since, at least in the FCC auctions,
most licenses displayed six-digit prices, bidders could use the last three digits
to encode messages. Code bids had diﬀerent natures. Some bidders used the
last three digits to “disclose” their identities. For example, in the AB auction
(Auction 4), GTE frequently used “483” as the last three digits; this number
corresponds to “GTE” on the telephone keypad. In other circumstances code
bidding had a reﬂexive nature. The last three digits were used by a bidder
both to signal a license of special interest to her and the license on which the
same bidder was punishing competitors for not bumping the ﬁrst market.8
In the JAMO mechanism, bidders are obliged to use code bidding in very
speciﬁc way: to stop bidding on a given license as soon as the price encodes
“meaningful” digits. However, this strategy would irrevocably exclude that
bidder from competing for that license, and with two objects, would there-
fore also exclude her from bidding for the bundle; moreover it would also
exclude her from performing any retaliation, since she should presumably be
8See Cramton (1997) and Cramton and Schwartz (1999, 2000) for detailed accounts of
collusive behavior in the actual FCC auctions.
8interested in purchasing the only remaining object. It follows that:
Proposition 4 Code bidding is ineﬀective in any PBE of the JAMO (with
two objects).
While this excludes signaling equilibria that rely on code bidding when two
objects are auctioned, the result may not extend to more than two objects.
For example, suppose three licenses are being auctioned, suppose a bidder is
interested in purchasing license, say 1, and that she is active on all licenses at
an early stage of the auction. Then she can stop bidding on, say, license 3 at
a price whose digits encode a message similar to the one used by GTE, while
remaining active on the other two licenses. This allows her to use license
2 as a potential threat for retaliation. The extent to which retaliation will
be successful or credible so as to eventually constitute a PBE of the corre-
sponding game, is something that is explored further below (in the context of
two objects). But in principle, a higher number of licenses for sale (without
restrictions on the number of licenses bidders are allowed to bid on) makes
for more possibilities of sending messages or code bids even in the JAMO
auction. Clearly, such a signaling device becomes more diﬃcult and costly to
use if prices are raised not continuously but in predetermined ﬁnite amounts.
Jump Bidding: It need not always be in the interest of the bidders to
increase prices at the minimum pace required by the auction rules. In fact,
Gunderson and Wang (1998) show how a bidder in a SEAMO can beneﬁt
by using jump bids as a signal of a high valuation, possibly causing other
bidders to drop out earlier; this may lead to lower revenues for the seller.9
While jump bids are possible in the SEAMO they are obviously not in the
JAMO. The FCC’s recent decision to limit the amount by which bids can be
raised e.g., in the LMDS auction (Auction 17), may suggest a change in this
direction, see also Cramton and Schwartz (2000).
Bid Withdrawals: While the FCC had originally allowed unlimited number
of bid withdrawals in order to allow bidders to make more eﬃcient aggre-
9A crucial assumption for the existence of these equilibria is that the bidder making
the jump bids have discontinuous support for valuations. See also Avery (1998) for further
equilibria involving jump bids in the context of one-object English auctions with aﬃliated
values.
9gations of licenses, it was soon noticed that they could be used as signaling
devices. As Cramton and Schwartz (2000) report, withdrawal bids were ap-
parently used in FCC auctions as part of a warning or of retaliatory strategies,
as well as part of cooperative strategies, where bidders attempted to split
licenses among themselves. Neither the JAMO nor the SEAMO versions de-
scribed above allow for withdrawal bids. Again, the FCC’s recent decision to
limit their number to two, e.g., in the LMDS auction (Auction 17), suggests
another change in this direction.
3.2 Closing Rules
Milgrom (2000) contains a description of the tˆ atonnement logic that inspired
most of the FCC auction rules. In particular, the rules speciﬁed that bidding
would remain open on all licenses until there were no new bids on any license.
This simultaneous closing rule allows each losing bidder to switch at any time
from the lost license to a substitute or to stop bidding on a complement.
However, as Milgrom points out, it is also vulnerable to collusion.
Milgrom’s Example: Consider the following example from Milgrom (2000).
Two bidders bid for two objects 1 and 2, which are each worth 1 to both
bidders. Milgrom shows that there exists a sequential equilibrium of the
SEAMO (with complete information) such that the selling price for both ob-
jects is ν, i.e., the smallest possible bid, and the bidders realize the highest
collusive payoﬀ of 2 · (1 − ν), (see Theorem 8, p. 264).
The logic of the equilibrium is that both players buy one object each at
the lowest possible price by using a simple threatening strategy: Bidder 1
bids ν on auction 1 if bidder 2 has never bid on 1; otherwise he does not bid.
If bidder 2 has bid on 1, then bidder 1 reverts to a “competitive” bidding
strategy, that is to keep bidding on each object until a price of 1 is reached;
bidder 2 plays symmetrically.
As Milgrom suggests, such a low revenue equilibrium is avoided if closing
is not simultaneous but rather license-by-license. According to such closing
rule, bidding would stop on a license if at any round there is no new bid on
that license. The JAMO provides an example of license-by-license closing.
Indeed, once all bidders but one drop from one license and remain active on
the other licenses, the ﬁrst license closes irrevocably. The result of Theo-
10rem 9 in Milgrom (2000), which states that at each (trembling-hand) perfect
equilibrium with license-by-license closing the price of each license is at least
1 − ν carries over to the JAMO (also with complete information), where in
fact the price of each license is exactly 1. By applying Prop. 2 to the exam-
ple described above where as in our usual framework the bidders’ values are
private information, the following result can be shown to follow:
Corollary 1 Suppose that bidders 1 and 2 have (private) values of 1 for both
objects, and α =0 , then, in the PBE of the JAMO, the selling price is 1 for
each object.
Such a selling price of 1 (or 1 − ν) is also not guaranteed in the SEAMO
with incomplete information as the equilibria constructed in Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Kahn (1998) and Brusco and Lopomo (2001) show.
The Collusive Equilibria of Brusco and Lopomo: Brusco and Lopomo
(2001) (henceforth BL) construct several kinds of PBE in undominated strate-
gies of the SEAMO (in our usual framework), some of which are very similar
to the ones constructed by Milgrom under complete information. Kwasnica
and Sherstyuk (2002) provide some experimental evidence for such equilibria
when there are few players and with small complementarities. We shall see
that none of BL’s equilibria are possible in the JAMO.
The logic of their collusive equilibria is as follows: Consider two global
bidders and, for simplicity, take α = 0. The bidders use the ﬁrst round
to signal to each other which of the two objects they value the most. If
they rank the objects diﬀerently, bidders conﬁrm their initial bids in all
subsequent rounds and obtain their most preferred object at the minimum
price; otherwise they revert to the “competitive” strategy of raising prices
on both objects up to their private values. BL then go on to reﬁne this
type of collusive equilibrium by allowing bidders to signal more than just the
identity of the higher valued object. This allows them to obtain collusive
equilibria even more favorable to the bidders. In particular, they show that
a collusive equilibrium may also arise when bidders have the same ranking
for the objects, also if there are more than two bidders as well as if there are
positive complementarities (α > 1); they also show, however, that the scope
for collusion diminishes as the number of bidders increases and the number
11of objects is ﬁxed at two; and the possibility of collusion is lowered if the
complementarities are large and variable.
Again, the rule driving the presence of such equilibria is the simultaneous
closing. The JAMO mechanism instead is built around the irrevocable exit
and induces license-by-license closing, which makes the rounds of signaling
necessary in the above equilibria impossible. In these examples bidders al-
ways have an incentive to bid for any object for which they have positive
value. In particular, it follows:
Corollary 2 The collusive equilibria constructed as PBE of the SEAMO in
Brusco and Lopomo (2001) are never PBE of the JAMO.
Note also that these collusive equilibria are not PBE of the JAMO even if
one allows for rounds of cheap talk between the bidders prior to the auction.
As it has often been pointed out, simultaneous closing has the advantage
of being more ﬂexible in allowing bidders to revise and update their bidding
behavior in forming aggregates, (see e.g., Cramton (1997, 1998), Milgrom
(1998, 2000), Cramton and Schwartz (1999, 2000)). Moreover, Kagel and
Levin (2000) point out that, especially for intermediate values of the com-
plementarities, ascending auctions may suﬀer from the exposure problem by
which global bidders may drop out too early from individual licenses thus
reducing eﬃciency. Although their comparison is with one-shot sealed bid
auctions, it seems plausible the exposure problem would be even more pro-
nounced in auctions with license-by-license closing than in ones with simul-
taneous closing. This is something that needs to be further investigated, also
in connection with the rules for withdrawing bids.
3.3 Retaliatory Equilibria and Withdrawal Rules
We have seen examples of collusive equilibria that are equilibria of the SEAMO
but are ruled out as equilibria of the JAMO. In this section, we show that
equilibria involving certain retaliatory strategies may nonetheless exist in
both the SEAMO and the JAMO.
Retaliatory Equilibria: The logic of these retaliatory equilibria is straight-
forward. Suppose that two objects are put for sale to two bidders, one global
bidder who is interested in both objects, and one local bidder who wishes
12to buy only object 1. Assume all this to be common knowledge. The two
bidders have overlapping interests on object 1, and the local bidder wants
the global bidder to exit early from object 1. In order to achieve this, the
local bidder actively bids on object 2, although the object has no value to
him. Such a strategy is potentially costly to both the local and the global
bidder; we refer to it as a retaliatory strategy. The extent to which the lo-
cal bidder is successful in inducing the global bidder to drop out early from
object 1 depends on whether he succeeds in making his threat credible. We
show that the JAMO is not immune to equilibria that eﬀectively involve such
strategies.
Proposition 5 There exist PBE of both the JAMO and the SEAMO where
bidders use retaliatory strategies eﬀectively.
Proof. In Example 2 below, we construct a family of such equilibria in
the context of the JAMO and the usual framework of Section 2.1; for the
SEAMO there will be corresponding equilibria as in Prop. 2. ¥
Before presenting the mentioned family of retaliatory equilibria, we ﬁrst con-
sider a simpler and more intuitive type of retaliatory equilibrium within a
slightly more special framework.
Example 1. Consider our usual framework with two objects and two bid-
ders; one local bidder interested in object 1 and one global bidder interested
in both objects 1 and 2, with the same value for the two objects, v1 = v2 = x,
and α = 0; assume also all values are drawn according to the uniform distri-
bution on [0,1]. It is easy to see that the following is a PBE of the JAMO:
– all types of the local bidder bid on both objects and stay on object 1 until
u1 a n do no b j e c t2u n t i lm i n ( u1,t 2
1+ν), where t2
1 is the global bidder’s exiting
time from object 1, and ν > 0 arbitrarily small;
–a l lt y p e so ft h eg l o b a lb i d d e re x i tf r o mo b j e c t1a tt + ν if at t the local
bidder is on object 2; otherwise all types of the global bidder stay on both
objects until x.
In equilibrium, the global bidder immediately drops out of object 1 inducing
the local bidder to also immediately drop out of object 2. As is often typical
in such retaliatory equilibria, the retaliating bidder (here the local bidder)
obtains a higher ex ante payoﬀ than in the standard equilibrium of Prop. 2,
13while the other agents (here the global bidder and the auctioneer) are both
worse oﬀ. ¥
To sustain these equilibria, the local bidder threatens the global bidder
with a harsh punishment if the latter does not drop out of object 1.
It can be checked that our assumption of uniformly distributed private
values, which guarantees the optimality of the global bidder’s strategy, turns
out to be a special case of the assumption made by BL to sustain their “most
collusive” equilibrium, namely, that the expected private value for each good
is no less than 1/2.10
The above example relies on the fact that the local bidder has some
extra information about the global bidder’s valuation of object 1 relative to
object 2. Without this information he needs to resort to a more reﬁned form
of signaling.
Example 2. Consider our usual framework of Section 2.1 with two objects
and two bidders; one local bidder interested in object 1 and one global bidder
interested in both objects 1 and 2, and suppose for simplicity α =0 ;a s s u m e
again all values are drawn according to the uniform distribution on [0,1].
Then, for any l ∈ (0,1], the following is a PBE of the JAMO:
– all types of local bidder with u1 ≤ l b i do n l yo no b j e c t1a n ds t a yu n t i lu1;
all types of local bidder with u1 >lbid on both objects and stay on object 1
until u1 and on object 2 until c = l(
√
2 − 1) <l ;
– all types of global bidder with v1 <lb i do nb o t ho b j e c t sa n ds t a yo n
object 1 until c and on object 2 until v2 whenever the local bidder is active
on both objects, staying until v1,v 2 respectively otherwise; all types of global
bidder with v1 ≥ l b i do nb o t ho bj e c t sa l w a y ss t a y i n gu n t i lv1,v 2 respectively.
This characterizes a family of retaliatory equilibria indexed by the parame-
ter l that are PBE of the JAMO, (see Section 4 for a proof). Note that the
equilibria are not in undominated strategies, since the local bidder always
has a (weakly) dominant strategy to drop from object 2 whenever it is the
only object he is bidding on. If the local bidder is active on both auctions
this signals that his valuation is above the threshold l, i.e., u1 >l ;i fh eb i d s
only on object 1, then u1 ≤ l, and both bidders bid up to their valuations
10We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out to us.
14a n do n l yo nt h eo b j e c t st h e yv a l u e .
When l = 1 we get the standard, non—retaliatory equilibrium of Prop. 2,
since with probability one the local bidder will not be active on object 1.
When l → 0 we almost get the standard equilibrium, since c → 0, i.e., the
local bidder enters both auctions but almost immediately exits object 2.
Unlike the equilibrium of Example 1, here, to ensure incentive compati-
bility for the local bidder, the bidding threshold c is such that he only weakly
prefers the retaliatory equilibrium, his ex ante payoﬀ i st h es a m ea si nt h e
standard equilibrium, i.e., 1/6; the global bidder continues to be worse oﬀ





















while due to the extra bidding on object 2, the auctioneer actually earns














3 ≥ 1/3 ∀l. ¥
Example 2, continued. It is worth pointing out that Example 2 can be
extended to a local bidder competing against an arbitrary number M of
global bidders with preferences as in cases (i) and (ii) of Section 2.1, and
with general distribution function F deﬁned on [0,1] for values. The PBE
described above is still a PBE for any l ∈ (α,1], where the parameter value




0(z)dz =( c − α) · G(l − α), (3)
where G = FM is the distribution function for the global bidders’ highest
valuation for object 1 (or 2). In presence of complementarities, the only
diﬀerence is that a global bidder exits object 1 at c if v1 + α <l ,w h e r e a s
if v1 + α >lhe behaves as described in Section 2.3.11 In order to ensure
incentive compatibility for the local bidder, as M increases, the parameter c
also increases. ¥
11This suggests that such retalatory equilibria may disappear when α > 1.
15Examples 1 and 2 are also close in spirit to the collusive equilibria of BL:
global bidders and the local bidder have overlapping interests on object 1;
the local bidder threatens to retaliate (i.e., to be active) on object 2 if the
global bidders do not exit object 1. This signaling device is eﬀective since it
is common knowledge that the retaliatory bidder is interested in one object
only. Thus by not “turning the light oﬀ” on object 2 when the price is zero,
the local bidder triggers the beliefs that sustain the collusive equilibrium.
JAMO vs. Sequential Auction: A necessary condition for triggering col-
lusive equilibria in the JAMO is simultaneous bidding on both objects. The
auctioneer could prevent bidders from adopting retaliatory strategy by sell-
ing the objects sequentially12 rather than simultaneously. Indeed, it is easy
to see that, at least with two objects, retaliatory strategies are ineﬀective,
since local bidders cannot gain by bidding on an object they do not value.
However, despite its proofness against retaliatory equilibria, the sequen-
tial auction becomes less attractive than other mechanisms under the as-
sumption that bidders play a “competitive” equilibrium. Indeed, Albano
et al. (2001) and Branco (2001) show that the sequential auction performs
rather poorly in terms of both eﬃciency and seller’s revenue as compared to
the JAMO and two one-shot sealed-bid auctions. In particular, the results
conﬁrm the intuition that simultaneous bidding is mainly responsible for the
(good) performance of the JAMO both in terms of eﬃciency and seller’s rev-
enue. However, the existence of collusive equilibria in the JAMO suggests
that there does exist a trade-oﬀ between designing auction rules in order to
increase eﬃciency and revenue, and allowing bidders to exploit the same set
of rules for reaching a certain degree of co-ordination.
Finally, we see what happens to the equilibria constructed in Examples 1
and 2 if one allows for withdrawal rules.
Withdrawal Rules: Withdrawal rules in the FCC auctions were originally
designed to allow for a more eﬃcient aggregation of licenses, and, until Auc-
tion 16, the FCC allowed an unlimited number of withdrawals. If a bidder
decides to withdraw her bid from a license, the FCC becomes the standing
high bidder, and the withdrawing bidder is charged a penalty equal to the
diﬀerence between the withdrawn bid and the selling price after the with-
12We are grateful to another referee for suggesting this point.
16drawal. However, if the penalty is suﬃciently low, bidders might use bid
withdrawals as a signaling device (as mentioned above) but also as part of a
retaliatory strategy.
Consider ﬁrst the equilibrium of Example 1. If bidders are allowed one
bid withdrawal, then as long as the local bidder does not withdraw his bid for
object 2 with probability greater than 1/2, this still leads to a PBE without
really aﬀecting the equilibrium outcome. It will still be optimal for the global
bidder to immediately exit from object 1, and both objects are sold at zero
prices in equilibrium. The only diﬀerence is that the out-of-equilibrium belief
that the local will continue to bid on object 2 if the global continues bidding
on object 1 is slightly more credible since the penalty to the local bidder is
reduced.
While the possibility of withdrawing bids makes for cheaper retaliatory
strategies, thus increasing the credibility that a bidder will continue to bid
on an object he does not value, at the same time, it also takes away the
commitment value that the retaliating bidder will buy the object he does not
value. It is easy to see that introducing the possibility of one bid withdrawal
destroys the equilibrium of Example 2, since on one hand, given the global
bidder’s strategy, the local bidder now has a strictly dominant (continuation)
strategy to withdraw all bids where he ends up having to buy the object he
does not value; unlike Example 1, this happens with positive probability in
equilibrium. On the other hand, if the global bidder assumes that the local
bidder will always withdraw his bid for an unwanted object, then she has a
best response to exit from the local bidder’s unwanted object, object 2, at
any ν > 0 and the standard equilibrium follows.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Recent research on multi-unit ascending auctions has highlighted the exis-
tence of two potentially conﬂicting features of the auction rules adopted by
the FCC and subsequently in some of the European UMTS auctions. On
one hand, the transparency and ﬂexibility of the bidding process eases an
eﬃcient aggregation of licenses; on the other, the amount of information
available to bidders together with the strategic possibilities allowed by the
rules may be used to implement tacit collusive agreements, see Cramton and
Schwartz (1999, 2000) and Klemperer (2001).
17By not allowing bidders to set the pace at which prices rise on individual
licenses, the auctioneer can make bidders’ signaling devices blunt without
losing the information revelation feature of the ascending mechanism. In
this sense we have maintained that the SEAMO facilitates tacit collusion
relative to the JAMO and have shown that several collusive equilibria, which
appear in the SEAMO, do not have a counterpart in the JAMO.
We have also shown that certain retaliatory equilibria are possible in both
the JAMO and the SEAMO. Again, it is evident from the construction of
such equilibria that they are “harder” to implement in a JAMO than in a
SEAMO. A more complete assessment of the relative performance of the
two auctions certainly requires further study. We outline some directions for
future research.
First, the framework is admittedly restrictive. For example, if the number
of licenses is greater than two, the set of equilibria is likely to depend on the
composition of the bundles that global bidders are interested in acquiring.
That is, with more than two objects there are several ways preferences over
bundles can overlap. It is also possible that code-bidding may reappear even
in the JAMO. But even with only two objects, the case of mild synergies
may already pose non-trivial existence problems.
Second, an issue that has not been addressed is the rationale of having
prices rise simultaneously (i.e., at the same “speed”) in the JAMO. We have
imposed the same “speed” on both objects, being aware that there is no
theoretical or empirical justiﬁcation for this assumption.
Third, other aspects of the FCC auctions such as activity rules, the num-
ber of allowable bid withdrawals, and the simultaneity of closing deserve
further investigation. Although some modiﬁcations of the standard SEAMO
undertaken by the FCC may be seen as changes in direction of the JAMO,
there seems to be no general agreement on e.g., whether closing should be
simultaneous or not. Albano et al. (2001) and Branco (2001) show that
under certain conditions, license-by-license closing may perform rather well
theoretically. Kagel and Levin (2000) on the other hand provide experi-
mental evidence indicating that, at least within certain ranges of bidders’
valuations, ineﬃciencies may arise due to what they call the “exposure prob-
lem”. Clearly, more needs to be done to better assess the theoretical and
empirical performance of the “Japanese” vs. “English” design of the auction
and the simultaneous vs. license-by-license closing, as well as of other rules
mentioned. Also, while the JAMO and the SA are theoretically equivalent
18it would be useful to obtain further experimental evidence contrasting their
relative performance.
Finally, motivated by considerations of market structure and bidder asym-
metries, Klemperer (1998, 2001) suggests an auction format he calls “Anglo-
Dutch” that combines an ascending or “English” auction with a ﬁrst-price
sealed-bid or “Dutch” auction. Our results suggest that an alternative that
may be worth considering in similar environments is a combination of a
“Japanese” with a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction. Similarly, Ausubel and Mil-
grom (2002) suggest an English ascending auction that allows for package
bidding in order to improve eﬃciency while avoiding some of the problems
arising for example from Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms. Also here it
may be worthwhile to consider a “Japanese” design while keeping the re-
maining features that allow bidders to bid on packages; of course, here the
question of how to increase the prices of the items for sale becomes even more
pressing.
Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : If bidders, upon observing a local bidder bidding
on an object objects they value, then the exiting times obtained from Eq. (1)
are clearly (weakly) dominant strategies for the local bidders, and they are
also (weakly) dominant (continuation) strategies for global bidders currently
bidding on only one object.13 Given these exiting times, in what follows, we
show that Eq. (1) also yields globally optimal exiting times for global bidders
bidding on two objects. We will argue using both the JAMO and the SA.
Case (ii) v1,v 2 ∈ [0,1] and α = 0, follows from the fact that, since α =0 ,
no global bidder has any incentive to exit on object k after vk,k=1 ,2. On
the other hand, there is no incentive to exit before vk either. As mentioned
in the text, these exiting times are also obtained by diﬀerentiating Π(p;Ht)
with respect to p and setting equal to zero.
The following lemmas cover the remaining cases (i) v1 = v2 = x ∈ [0,1]
and α ≥ 0, and (iii) v1,v 2 ∈ [0,1] and α > 1. Fix a global bidder h and let yk
denote the highest exiting time on object k among all other bidders. For any
13In the auction for object k, a local bidder will bid uk, and a global bidder will bid vk
or vk + α depending on whether he has already dropped or won the other object.
19given strategy proﬁle of the other bidders, denote by Gk(·|Ht)t h ec u m u l a t i v e
distribution function of yk given the information Ht. Let further Hk
t denote
the information set Ht, where the global bidder h has exited object k at t.
Then we can state:
Lemma 1 If Gk(·|Ht) ≤ Gk(·|H
3−k
t ),f o rk =1 ,2, then in the JAMO global
bidders exit both objects simultaneously.
The condition on Gk implies that if global bidder h exits one object, the
probability of winning the other object will not increase. Therefore, it is
always optimal to stay on object k at least until vk. We need to show that
for both objects the optimal exiting time τ ≥ Max{v1,v 2}.C a s e( i )i sc l e a r ,
since τ ≥ v1 = v2 = x. To see case (iii), assume without loss of generality
that v2 ≥ v1. If a global bidder wins one object he will necessarily win both
objects, since we are assuming (weakly) undominated continuation strategies,
which would lead all other remaining bidders to exit at the latest at 1 from
the second object. Therefore, a global bidder who is active on two objects
has nothing to lose if he stays on the two objects (at least) until v2.I n d e e d ,
if he exits object 1 before v2, he does not increase the probability of winning
object 2 and he loses the opportunity of winning the bundle. More formally,
at t ∈ (v1,v 2), the global bidder’s expected proﬁt from exiting object 1 is
E[(v2 − y2)1{y2≤v2}|H1
t ]. If instead, he stays on the two objects until v2 and
then exit the two objects only if he wins no object before v2, then his expected
payoﬀ is
E[(v1 + v2 + α − (y1 + y2))1{min{y1,y 2}≤v2}|Ht]
≥ E[(v1 + α − max{y1,y 2})1{min{y1,y 2}≤v2}|Ht]
+E[(v2 − min{y1,y 2})1{min{y1,y 2}≤v2}|H
1
t ]
>E [(v2 − y2)1{y2≤v2}|H
1
t ]
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Gk(·|Ht) ≤ Gk(·|H
3−k
t ), k =1 ,2a n d
the second from y1,y 2 ≤ 1 < α. Thus, it is suboptimal to exit object 1 before
v2 and therefore the bundle bidder will exit simultaneously the two objects
at a price no smaller than v2.14
14To prove uniqueness of a symmetric PBE, in case (i), we note the assumption on Gk
can be dispensed with, since it follows directly from symmetry of the equilibrium strategies.
20Lemma 2 Eq. (1) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a globally op-
timal exiting time whenever M =1and N1,N 2 are arbitrary.
We prove the lemma for a global bidder active on the two objects. The
local bidders’ strategies is not aﬀected by Ht, thus when a global bidder
faces only local bidders, we have Gk(·|Ht)=Gk(·|H
3−k
t ). From Lemma 1
and Prop. 1, in the SA, for the global bidder it is optimal to submit the same
bid p on the two objects. Then, three possible outcomes arise with probability
1: (i) p is the lowest bid and the global bidder exits the auction; (ii) a local
bidder sets the lowest bid on object 1; (iii) a local bidder sets the lowest bid
on object 2. Let FN(·|t) denote the cumulative distribution function of the
lowest valuation among N local bidders given that their valuation for the
object is at least t,a n dl e tfN(·|t)=F 0
N(·|t). More speciﬁcally we can write
FN(x|t)=1− (1 − F(x|t))N,w h e r eF(x|t)=
F(x)−F(t)
1−F(t) is the cumulative
distribution of a local bidder’s valuation given that his valuation is at least









Consequently, the necessary condition is obtained deriving with respect to p:
Π
0(p;Ht)=πL1(p,Ht)(1 − FN2(p|t))fN1(p|t)











since (1 − FNk(s|t))fN3−k(s|t)=N3−k(1 − F(p|t))N1+N2−1f(p|t), and hence




























21In order to verify that π00(τ;Ht) ≤ 0, it is suﬃc i e n tt ot h a to b s e r v et h a tt h e
second term vanishes and that πL1(p,Ht)a n dπL2(p,Ht) are not increasing
in p. Indeed, πL1(p,Ht) is the global bidder’s continuation payoﬀ given that
all remaining local bidders’ valuation for the objects is at least p that is also
the minimum admissible bid in the next round. Clearly, an increase in p
cannot improve πL1(p,Ht).
Lemma 3 The exiting times deﬁned by Eq. (2) are nondecreasing functions
of vB.
By Lemma 1 the global bidder drops out simultaneously from both ob-
jects, which implies that in case (iii), since α ≥ 1, either they win both
objects or none; this implies that their expected payoﬀ functions and hence
their exiting times will depend only on the value of the bundle vB.S i n c e
x =( vB − α)/2t h i si sc l e a r l yt r u ea l s oi nc a s e( i ) .
Suppose τ = τ(vB;Ht) is a global bidder’s equilibrium bid at information
set Ht when his value for the bundle is vB. T h e ni tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t












for p = τ. Now, the probability of winning at any given price depends only
on the other bidder’s valuation, and the global bidder’s ex-post payoﬀ is non-
decreasing in vB.T h u s ,i f¯ vB >v B is the global bidder’s value for the bun-
dle, then the corresponding expressions ¯ πL1(p,Ht)a n d¯ πL2(p,Ht), computed
with the higher value ¯ vB, are not smaller than the counterparts πL1(p,Ht)
and πL1(p,Ht) computed with vB. Finally, considering that Π00(τ;Ht) ≤ 0
we have that Π
0
(p;Ht) ≥ Π0(p;Ht)i m p l i e st h a ti fτ is optimal for vB at Ht,
submitting τ0 ≥ τ is better for the global bidder with ¯ vB.
Lemma 4 Eq. (1) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a globally op-
timal exiting time for M, N1,a n dN2 arbitrary.
The proof is by (backward) induction. Consider a global bidder who
after some suﬃciently large number of stages of the SA is still active on the
two objects such that either there is no other global bidder active on the
two objects, in which case Lemma 2 applies, or all active bidders are global
22bidders, in which case, it is a (weakly) dominant strategy to bid vB/2o n
both objects.
Let Ht be such that there are two global bidders and Nk local bidders on
objects k =1 ,2. Fix global bidder h,a n dl e tv1 and v2 be his valuation for
the two objects. Let τ(vB;Ht) be a global bidder’s strategy in a symmetric
equilibrium. The ﬁrst step is to prove that the global bidders exit simulta-
neously from the two objects and that the equilibrium strategy τ(vB;Ht)i s
not decreasing in vB.I no r d e rt op r o v et h eﬁrst property it is suﬃcient to
choose appropriately the out-of-equilibrium-path beliefs for the global bid-
ders. Indeed, if each global bidder believes that exiting only on one object
will not increase the probability of winning the other object, then, by Lemma
1, it will be optimal to exit simultaneously the two objects. For the second
property, as customary in auction theory, we assume that τ(vB;Ht)i sn o t
decreasing in vB then we show that the equilibrium strategy τ(·)s a t i s ﬁes this
restrictions.
If at the information set Ht, global bidder h bids p on the two objects,












+ πB(p,Ht)(1 − FN1+N2(p|Ht))fB(p|Ht), (5)
where πL(p,Ht)a n dπB(p,Ht) are the continuation payoﬀs if respectively a
local bidder or another global bidder sets the lowest bid p ≥ t;a n dFB(·|Ht)
is the cumulative distribution of the other global bidders’ lowest bid, and
fB(·|Ht)=F0
B(·|Ht).
If τ(·;Ht) is nondecreasing in the value of the bundle, πL(p;Ht) = 0 for
all p ≥ τ(vB;Ht). Indeed, πL(p;Ht) is the continuation payoﬀ when the other
global bidder bids more than p.H o w e v e r , i f p ≥ τ(vB;Ht), then the other
global bidder will value the bundle at least as much as global bidder h.T h i s
implies that bidder h cannot expect a positive proﬁt in the following rounds.
23Thus, at a symmetric equilibrium, the optimal bid will be the smallest p that
solves
πB(p;Ht)(1 − FN1+N2(p|Ht))fB(p|Ht)=0 . (6)
Since πB corresponds to a situation where the lowest bid is made by a global
bidder, this means that the only remaining active global bidder is bidder h,















where τ is the smallest s such that the argument of the integral is zero.
Therefore, τ(vB;Ht)=τ = τ∗(vB;Ht) that is not decreasing in vB for Lemma
3. This proves the lemma for the case of two global bidders and N1 + N2
local bidders.
Suppose now that the number of global bidders is M>2. Observe that at
a symmetric equilibrium where τ(vB;Ht)i si n c r e a s i n gi nvB, global bidder h’s
continuation payoﬀ is positive only if in the current round there is no other
global bidder submitting a higher price than his own. Thus, if with M − 1
global bidders the optimal bid (or exiting time) is τ(vB;Ht)=τ = τ∗(vB,H t)









where, by some abuse of notation, HB
p is the information set Ht updated
by the fact that a bundle bidder exited with a bid of p.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t
also with M global bidders the optimal bid is τ(vB;Ht)=τ = τ∗(vB;Ht)
determined as the smallest p solving Eq. (2) that is increasing in vB. ¥
Proof of Example 2: We directly prove the general case mentioned at the
end of the example. There are M global bidders and one local bidder on
object 1; preferences are according to cases (i) or (ii); values are drawn from
a smooth distribution F deﬁned on [0,1].
We ﬁrst check optimality for any global bidder, then we check it for the
local bidder. If the local bidder is active on both objects, global bidders infer
that u1 >l . Hence, a global bidder with v1+α ≤ l knows that he will not win
object 1 even if he wins object 2 and then continues optimally until v1 + α
24on object 1. Therefore, exiting object 1 at time c and exiting object 2 at v2
is a (weak) best reply for such a global bidder. If, however, v1 + α >l ,t h e n
a global bidder is better oﬀ remaining on each object so long as his expected
continuation payoﬀ remains strictly positive. Namely, if v1,v 2 ∈ [0,1] and
α = 0, (case (ii)), then a global bidder remains on objects 1 and 2 until v1
and v2 respectively. On the other hand, if v1 = v2 = x and α ≥ 0, (case (i)),
then a global bidder’s strategy will be of the type described in Section 2.3:
there is an optimal time τ that depends on vB and Ht such that, if he does
not win any object before τ he exits both objects, and he continue optimally
until x+α otherwise. This proves that the global bidders’ strategy is a best
reply to the local bidder’s strategy.
To prove optimality for the local bidder, we need to show that the local
bidder’s strategy is a best reply and that it is proﬁtable for the local bidder to
b i do nb o t ho b j e c t si fa n do n l yi fu1 >l , i.e., that the equilibrium is incentive
compatible, so that being active on both objects gives a credible signal that
u1 >l .L e tyk ∈ [0,1] denote the global bidders’ highest valuation for object
k, k =1 ,2, and let G = F M denote the corresponding distribution function.
Keep in mind that the global bidder with the highest valuation for object
2 will exit auction 2 before c only if y2 <c . When the local bidder is not
active on object 2 and still active on object 1, the bundle bidder with the
highest valuation for object 1 will exit auction 1 at y1 + α.W h e nt h el o c a l
bidder is active on object 2, if y1 ≤ l − α, then the global bidder with the
highest valuation for object 1 will exit auction 1 at c;w h e r e a si fy1 >l− α
and the local bidder is still active on object 1, then the global bidder with
the highest valuation for object 1 will exit auction 1 at y1 + α.
If u1 <c , then it is clearly not optimal for the local bidder to bid on both
objects since he will have to pay at least c for object 1. Hence we assume
u1 ≥ c. Suppose that u1 ≤ l. If the local bidder decides to implement the
retaliatory strategy, then his expected payoﬀ is
R l−α
0 (u1 − c) · G0(y1)dy1 − R c
0 y2 · G0(y2)dy2. The ﬁrst integral is the local bidder’s payoﬀ from object
1: the local bidder wins object 1 only if y1 <l− α, (recall that l ∈ (α,1])
and he pays c. The second integral is the expected payoﬀ from object 2:
if y2 <c , then he has to buy object 2 at a price y2. If, however, at time
0 the local bidder decides to bid only on object 1, his expected payoﬀ is R u1−α
0 (u1 − y1 − α)G0(y1)dy1.
At equilibrium we want the local bidder to bid only on object 1 when
25u1 ≤ l, i.e., the following needs to be satisﬁed
Z l−α
0




y2 · (y2)dy2 ≤
Z u1−α
0
(u1 − y1 − α) · G
0(y1)dy1,
which is satisﬁed for c solving Eq. (3).
Suppose now that u1 >l .T h e n , a t t = 0, the local bidder’s expected
payoﬀ from adopting the retaliatory strategy must be greater or equal than
the payoﬀ from bidding only on object 1, i.e.,
Z l−α
0













(u1 − y1 − α) · G
0(y1)dy1
It is easy to check that the above inequality is satisﬁed for any t<cand for
any l ∈ (α,1]. Finally an appropriate choice of out of equilibrium path belief
guarantees that at any t<cthe local bidder’s expected payoﬀ by insisting
with the retaliatory strategy is greater or equal than the payoﬀ of exiting
object 2 and continuing on object 1. ¥
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